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Mill's philosophy of the moral sciences

Brent Wall
Lehigh University

MILL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL SCIENCES

by

Brent Wall

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to view John Stuart Mill's Logic of the Moral Sciences in terms of a polemic, rather than as the outgrowth of his logic of the natural sciences. Traditional interpretations have emphasized Mill's naturalism and inductivism; the interpretation embodied in this paper seeks to show that a better understanding of Mill's social methodology is effected if one approaches his work from the polemic among Mill, his father, MacCaulay, and Comte. This latter viewpoint has the virtue of presenting Mill's social methodology more systematically in that it coherently incorporates Mill's experimentalism, deductivism, and historicism. Where applicable I have pointed out those places where Mill's position is in danger of contradiction.

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May 14, 1969
(date)

Ralph Ludy
Professor in charge

David J. Hillman
Head of the Department

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INTRODUCTION

John Stuart Mill's philosophy of social methodology has more than mere historical relevance. Mill sought to effect a synthesis of three divergent methods and to combine them into a novel view of social methodology. By studying Mill we can learn how far a synthesis of inductivism, deductivism, and historicism can be realized given Mill's assumptions. A critical evaluation of his program would give present day philosophers understanding of either a fruitful avenue to pursue or a deadend to be avoided.

Most who have dealt with Mill's social methodology have done so by interpreting it as the natural outgrowth and conclusion of the first five books of his Logic. This approach, however, minimizes the influences of Comte, MacCaulay, and James Mill on the mature presentation of John Mill's social methodology. By interpreting the sixth book of the Logic as an integral part of the work as a whole, commentators have overemphasized the natural scientific aspect of Mill's methods, and have, thereby, underemphasized his historicism and deductivism.

This paper is an attempt to show the development of John S. Mill's social methodology from the point of view of a polemic -- viz. the debate between his father and MacCaulay.

Taking this point of view as a starting point, I shall then see how Mill combined both of these methods with some of Auguste Comte's views to come up with a new social methodology.

The interpretational viewpoint of this paper, therefore, is atypical since it does not consider the sixth book of Mill's A System of Logic as a natural outgrowth of the preceeding five books, so much as it sees Mill's social methodology as a development of forces that were -- by and large -- extraneous to the considerations of his natural science methodology. Hence, we shall here examine his social theory almost completely in isolation; that is, we shall deal with it in terms of the original polemic, Mill's viewsof Comte, and then the "synthesis" Mill thought he effected between these three divergent positions.

In 1830, when Mill was working on his Logic, he was at a crossroads, for he did not fully grasp the nature or extent of induction. In 1830 an article by MacCaulay appeared in the "Edinburgh Review" which attacked James Mill's Essay on Government. In his Autobiography Mill noted:

> I now saw, that as a science is either deductive or experimental, according as, in the province it deals with the effects of causes when conjoined, are or are not the causes of the effects which the same causes produce when separate. It followed that politics must be a deductive science. It thus appeared that both MacCaulay and my father were wrong; the one in assimilating the method of philosophizing in politics to the purely experimental method of chemistry; while the other, though right in adopting a deductive method, had made a wrong selection

> of one, having taken as the type of deduction, not the appropriate process, that of the deductive branches of natural philosophy, but the inappropriate one of pure geometry.[1]

With this insight Mill got a secure foothold into what he considered to be the nature of social scientific method. He avers,

> a foundation was thus laid in my thoughts for the principal chapters of what I afterward published or the logic of the Moral Sciences.[2]

The aim of his social methodology was:

> to find out whether moral sciences exist or can exist, to what degree of perfection they are susceptible of being carried; and by what selection...of the methods brought into view in the previous part of this work that degree of perfection is attainable. (VI,i,1)

That is, Mill will start from the point of view of the debate and then see how far he can apply his philosophy of the natural sciences. He believed that by generalizing the methods followed in the prior books to the moral sciences, he would be able to make the moral sciences scientific. (VI,i,1) Hence, while I shall start from the point of view of a polemic, I shall, where relevant, include those elements of Mill's natural science methodology.

In chapter one I shall review the three methodologies Mill considers; in chapter two we shall present Mill's own method; in the last chapter we shall evaluate our approach to the problem.

I. THE POLEMIC

JAMES MILL'S DEDUCTIVISM

James Mill believed that only a deductive method could be used in studying social phenomena. John Mill, in discussing his father's views, called his method the abstract or geometrical mode of inquiry.

The primary assumption under which induction can be used is, according to John Mill, only when each effect can be connected exclusively with one cause.[3] But this is not possible in the social sciences, for in society each effect is an aggregate result of many causes.[4] Hence, induction cannot be the method best suited for explaining society -- rather one must use the deductive method.

James Mill adopted the method of geometrical deduction to explain social phenomena. John Mill remarked:

> In the geometrical theory of society, it seems to be supposed that this is really the case with social phenomena; that each of them results from only one force one single property of human nature.[5]

That is, all social causes can be reduced to a single factor: viz,, the law of self-interest. This law is the basic potulate of James Mill's methodology. An explanation of the causes of any effects in society are, or can be reduced to, man seeking his self-interest: the prediction of any future state of affairs can be realized by examining the self-interests of the parties involved.

John Mill agreed with his father's deductivism while disputing his basic assumption; namely, that in society the basic causative factor was that each man sought his own self-interest. Men in society are variously motivated; e.g., it is difficult to explain the prevalent phenomena that men do subordinated themselves to national callings, etc.[6] The causes apparent in society are many -- not one.[7] Mill also criticized his father's deductions for they left no room for empirical verification of predicted results.

MACCAULAY'S EXPERIMENTALISM

MacCaulay sought with his "chemical" or experimental method to explain social phenomena by emphasizing experimentation, induction, and empirical verification.

MacCaulay's basic assumption was that individual men were not the concern of the social sciences rather he emphasized the view that to explain a social phenomena one must concern himself with groups or with institutions.[8] In short, to find the cause of a social occurrence one need only to concoct an experiment, and from this (and other experiments) one could make generalizations based on these inquiries by using inductive techniques. In this way explanations of social phenomena could be effected.[9]

Mill rejected MacCaulay's basic assumption: "Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of

substance."[10] That is, it is not necessary to study groups in order to know why men act as they do. The social fabric is nothing more than a physical concatonation of atomic particulars for Mill. This method also errs in supposing that it is possible to experiment in society.[11] MacCaulay -- like Bentham -- failed to cognize that:

> in social phenomena the composition of causes is the universal law.[12]

Now the experimental method is inadequate in that it tries to establish inductive generalizations of phenomena that have many causes.

COMTE'S HISTORICISM

Auguste Comte in his Cours de Filosofie Positive proposed a historical method for the social sciences. Comte thought that men study history in order to formulate the laws of change or progress. His plan was to discover how one antecedent state of society -- en toto -- produced a succeeding state. He was not, in short, interested in why "a" caused "b" given a certain stage of society. Rather, he was on another level where he wants to know how stage of society "a" causes stage "b". He called this level of investigation the dynamical -- i.e., where one trys to uncover the laws of change. The static, on the other hand, endeavors to explain phenomena given a state of society. "By a study and analysis of the general facts of history [we can] discover... the law of

progress."[13] Comte felt that these laws would enable men to predict future events.

Mill believed that the great shortcoming of this approach is that there is no role for the verification of predictions; that is, Mill felt that the conclusions that an analysis of history can give can only be "empirical laws."[14] To be verified and hence to be universal laws, the historical generalizations must be connected to what Mill termed the two universal sciences -- ethology and psychology. The laws of ethology (the science of character) and the laws of psychology "govern the action of circumstances on men and of men on circumstances."[15] Comte did not realize this.

Though each of these theories err fundamentally each does contain a kernel of truth. James Mill saw that a social scientific method must be deductive; MacCaulay believed that deductions are worthless unless verified; Comte thought that a study of history can uncover the laws that govern changes of whole societies. In the next section we shall see how Mill combines these elements into a new formula.

II. MILL'S SOCIAL METHODOLOGY

A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI METHODOLOGIES

A useful and informative starting point for understanding Mill's methods is his essay On the Definition of Political Economy. He considered in it the two possible methods that could be applicable in the social sciences: the apriori and the aposteriori. By aposteriori he meant "that which requires as the basis of its conclusions...specific experience;"[16] i.e., a method of pure induction. Apriori method is, reasoning from an assumed hypothesis; which is not a practice confined to mathematics, but is the essence of all science...."[17] Apriori science reasons from assumptions, not from facts: aposteriori method is the inverse. Apriori science works downward from hypotheses to facts -- the aposteriori method from facts to conçlusions.[18]

Those moral sciences which are apriori, i.e., deductive are, for example, political economy, sociology, etc. But the conclusions drawn from the hypotheses of these sciences are but "theoretically true", they become true by being empirically verified. This element was lacking in James Mill's methods.[19] Hence, the only method applicable for these moral sciences is the apriori (deductive). This is so primarily because experimentation in society is impossible, hence the establishment of any conclusions --

demonstrative conclusions, that is -- cannot be realized: at best one would end up with a Baconian compendium of generalizations which would be merely contingently the case.[20]

THE DIRECT DEDUCTIVE METHOD

As we have just seen, much of science is a priori, or deductive. The subject matter of the deductive methodology is states of society or social statics -- what Mill called the theory of consensus. Social statics deals only with co-existent -- and not successive -- phenomena. A condition which governs the subject matter is that the effects and causes in a given state react (or interact) mechanically and not chemically:

> The effect produced, in social phenomena, by any complex set of circumstances, amounts precisely to the sum of the effects of the circumstances taken singly.[21]

Before proceeding, we should note that the paradigm under which the conclusions and procedures of this method proceed is that of tidology -- for this science is indeed a science though not exact.

We will now consider the steps in applying this methodology. As noted before, social phenomena are a compendium of many given causes hence we must use a deductive method the first step of which is:

(1) the establishment of either

(a) a generalization by induction or

(b) a hypothesis[22]

The next step is:

(2) deductive conclusions drawn from the hypotheses.

That is, given A what must be; by deduction, for example, B and C are concluded. The final step is:

(3) Verification of conclusions[23]

Here the predictions made in step two are corrobated or negated by checking them empirically.

Having stated Mill's direct method that deals with most of the social sciences a few remarks are in order. First, Mill has fulfilled one of his aims -- viz., he has shown to what extent natural science methods can be used in the moral sciences. Secondly, he has incorporated Comte's distinction between the statical and the dynamical. Third, we see here the synthesis that Mill effected between his father's deductivism and MacCaulay's empiricism -- all within Comte's framework. Fourth, it must now be asked: what status can these deductively verified conclusions have in Mill's system? Too, we must ascertain the limits and applications of this method.

There are many causative agents that function simultaneously in society each of which produces its own "tendency". Given this situation, the predictions that any one hypothesis

makes will at best be only a, "prediction...of tendencies".[24] The role of verification is to check our predictions against these tendencies; in so doing Mill hoped to avoid error. Thus, sociology, "cannot be a science of positive predictions, but only of tendencies."[25] Mill noted, however, that, "a knowledge of tendencies...gives us to a considerable extent this power (of prediction)."[26]

Following Anschutz's lead we here must ask: does the law of the universal composition of causes deal with a surface phenomena or with the underlying causes of these phenomena. If they are phenomenal, Mill cannot hope for a demonstrative science of society; if they are "real" he can -- but here he is in an epistemological quagmire. Or, to put the question another way: is an explanation of tendencies, or of phenomenal sequences (which are corrigible). This consideration has important consequences for Mill's deductive method: presumably, a hypothesis or a generalization is merely descriptive of a given state of affairs, it becomes explanatory when it is verified.[27] The problem is: what is explained, a phenomenal sequence or an underlying tendency. It would seem that here Mill is using a realist approach.

A short note on the limit of static investigations and of the nature of this limit: In society this is a consensus, "similar to that existing among the various organs (of the body)."[28] By consensus Mill meant that there is a constant and inductable interaction of all the elements of society given

any state of that society.[29] He remarked however, that though this state of affairs is true, it is

> not the less true that different species of social facts are in the main dependent...on different kinds of causes; and therefore...must be studied apart.[30]

Some of those sciences which can and must be studied apart are, e.g., political science, sociology, etc.

As Mill noted it was not Bentham's opinions "but his method" that constituted the novelty of his work.[31] We have now considered that method as used by Mill. The distinctive character of it here is that Mill puts it within a new framework -- i.e., within the realm of social statics -- and he adds a new element; viz., empirical verification.

In retrospect, we can see that this is neither more nor less than the so-called hypothetico-deductive method of the natural sciences. As such, it was not in Mill's time an advance in thought per se; its significance lies in the fact that Mill takes this method and consciously applies it to social phenomena. In this endeavor Mill was a member of his age; he, Marx, Spencer, etc. were a new breed of men who began to study society in order to understand it.

THE INVERSE DEDUCTIVE OR HISTORICAL METHOD

The inverse method of social methodology is merely the reverse of the direct deductive method -- albeit at a different level.[32] In the latter method we begin with a hypothesis and work downward; with the former mode we begin with empirical verities (i.e., that x is the case, etc.) and reason backwards as to the probable cause or causes of a given antecedent.

It was an axiom of belief for Mill that to have a science of society it was necessary to be able to explain and predict society on both a statical and a dynamical plane. Now the direct deductive method avers to do the former -- the inverse, the latter.[33] Hence, the distinctive subject matter of the historical method is successive phenomena; i.e., of the "laws of progress". In relation to this, the historical method seeks to understand how one state of society (consensus "A") produces a subsequent state of society (consensus "B").

The basic procedure of this method is to study the events of history and from these to formulate the laws of succession of states of society.[34] These laws are not merely empirical, rather they are second-level, or descriptive-explanatory (predictive law), though they lack the universality of the laws of association.

Now by a state of society Mill meant "the simultaneous state of all the greater social facts or phenomena."[35] Or, again, using the organic model, "states of society are like different constitutions or different ages in the physical frame;

they are conditions...of the whole organism." [36]

Now the statics of the laws that Comte achieved with his system were merely empirical. Mill to raise these laws to a scientific level insisted that they must be validated (not verified) by connecting them with the universal and necessary laws of psychology and character.[37] Once validated, it is possible to escape mere empiricism, for the scientific laws will show us how it is that it is, "the whole which produces the whole." [38]

For Mill, the story is not complete for he wants a science of society en toto. To consider this, we now turn to his laws of correspondence. Before leaving this section, I want to re-emphasize the novelty of Mill's approach to the historical method: when taking Comte's basic idea of studying social change he moulded it according to his idea of what it is that would make a historical generalization valid -- namely, the integrating of social change according to the structures of universal psychology.

THE LAWS OF CORRESPONDENCE

Mill devotes but one section in Book six of his LOGIC to the "laws of correspondence." Here, as in so many other places, what he intends is not too clear.

"To obtain better empirical laws," Mill felt that it is necessary that we combine, "the statical view of social phenomena with the dynamical...."[39] To do this attention

must be paid to both, "the progressive changes of different elements," and to the, "contemporaneous condition of each."[40] This done, it will then be possible to empirically obtain the law of correspondence.

That which corresponds, accordingly, is the state of a given society (and all of its elements ipso facto) with the "simultaneous changes, of those elements."[41] The law which would connect both kinds of phenomena (of succession and of co-existence) would be a law that states the interrelationship between both levels, i.e., how they interact.

However, this law of correspondence would remain a merely empirical law unless it were connected to the universal laws of psychology.[42] Upon being validated the law would become scientific and thus not merely descriptive, but explicative and predictive.

This law can be discovered, but its uncovering would be a, "difficult process of observation and comparison."[43] In short, what Mill looked for here was a law that: (1) explained the causes of social change; and (2) explained the causal relationships between the various elements in a given state of society.

Va sans dire that it would have been a coup de grace if he could have discovered that one element, "in the complex existence of social man (that) is pre-eminent over all others as the prime agent of the social movement."[44] For this one middle-level law would be the key that would unlock all of

the causes of both successive and co-existent phenomena.

Mill continued:

> There really is one social element which is thus predominant...among the agents of social progression. This is the state of speculative faculties of mankind, including the nature of beliefs.[45]

Hence, the state of belief essentially determines, "the moral and political state of the community,"[46] as well as the physical state of society.

This fact, Mill avered, is corrobated by history; it only remains to be proven whether it can be validated, "by deducing it apriori from the principles of human nature."[47] (i.e. from psychology).

Hence, Mill proposes that the basic law of correspondence is the state of belief of man. By possessing this law one could both explain how society changes, and how the elements of each society are mutually related.[48]

III. CONCLUSIONS

Thus is the structure of Mill's social methodology. In it we see many older theories blended together to form a new entity. We see deductivism blended with empiricism; we see historicism blended with psychologism. Mill's social methodology is, in some respects, like his political economy. It is said that Mill's economics makes Ricardo's views intelligible. In much the same vein, most of the elements in Mill's scientific method are not new -- what is new is the Comtian context in which they are used, and the way in which the methods are combined.

Mill sought to synthesize into one comprehensive method all of the best that had preceeded him. Thus he did effect a synthesis of MacCaulay and James Mill on at least one level. This does not mean to say that his account is not without its problems; e.g. what is explained by his methods, etc. This problem and others have been dealt with both in the body of this essay and in the notes.

In the preceeding I considered Mill's philosophy of the social sciences from the point of view of a polemic, Mill's reaction to it, his incorporation of Comte's views -- all of which resulted in Mill's own statement of the

true nature of social methodology.

The presentation of this paper has, I feel, helped in understanding to a higher degree Mill's final position. By picking up the problem in this way, rather than dealing with it as an outgrowth of the rest of the Logic, the context within which the debate and the formulation of his social methodology took place is, I feel, and becomes, much clearer than if one deals with it solely in terms of a book in his treatise on logic.

NOTES

1. J.S. Mill, Autobiography, in Essential Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), p.98.

2. Ibid.

3. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906) BK III, ch. 10, sec. 1.
   Mill remarks that his five canons of induction (and thereby, mutatis mutandis, induction in general) and their use have certain boundary conditions:
   > "...We have supposed that there was only one possible assemblage of conditions from which the given effect could result."

4. J.S. Mill, On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, ed. Henry M. Magid (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp.69-71.
   What is meant by deduction and how it is used in the social sciences will be taken up in detail in section four where we will treat J.S. Mill's social methodology.

5. Ibid.,pp. 70-71.

6. This same basic ploy is used by J. Mill in his Utilitarianism, where he broke down the monolithic explications of Bentham into a multicausative complex in the moral realm. Both of these approaches underline Mill's basic sensitivity to complexities (albeit he was blind to them in other spheres), and they also highlight the view that more often than not, truth is a composite of many factors.

7. The Moral Sciences, pp. 69, 72-73. The Bentham School:
   > "...founded their general theory of government on one comprehensive premise namely, that men's actions are always determined by their interests".

   Mill retorted:
   > "Taking the doctrine...an objection presents itself in limne (on the threshold), which might be deemed a fatal one, namely, that so sweeping a proposition is far from being universally true".

8. The Moral Sciences, p.59.

9. The explication of this method is not clear; e.g., how and by what procedures does one experiment?; how does one isolate the causes, etc.? Mill's exposition of both MacCaulay's and his father's methods gives, at best, a general idea of the nature and operation of them. Mill treated them as prefunctorally as he did because his main interest was to criticize them while adopting certain elements of each.

10. The Moral Sciences, p.59.

11. Ibid., 69-78. In this connection, Mill considers how, if at all, one could apply his five inductive canons in social contexts. His conclusion is, in each case, that it is impossible to do so. Of course, what Mill does here is to equate all induction with his five canons -- each of these are a kind of induction by elimination: i.e., the antecedent of the consequent is not a, b, c, or d hence it must be e. Mill thought that it was virtually impossible to know when we have successfully eliminated all possible antecedents. But to conclude from this that all induction is not valid in society is to overlook induction by enumeration which merely seeks to establish probabilities. Of course, given Mill's aim -- namely, he wanted a demonstrative method that would both prove and discover the basis of a belief -- his statement is correct. Albeit, it is incumbent to him to prove this contention. See: E. Nagel's introduction to his John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950, XV-XVIII.

12. Ibid., p.59. At this stage in the argument it is best to say that this proposition functions as a basic postulate. How Mill arrived at the conclusion that it was a universal and not an empirical law would take us too far afield if pursued. Hume's problem is germane here: given Mill's empiricism how can he say that the law is universal?

13. Ibid., p. 103. Here we see a new element, one over and above the two previous theories discussed; now instead of merely explaining (by a historical analysis of causes) how one state of society produces another, one can now, by an analysis of the present state of society, predict what state will succeed the present one. Exactly how one should go about this "totalistic" or "wholistic" analysis Mill does not say.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. J.S. Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy, in E. Nagel John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950), p.424.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p.423.

19. Ibid., p.425.

> "the conclusions of political economy, like those of geometry, are only true... in the abstract."

A few notes of clarification are germane here: one, by moral sciences Mill means roughly what we today call social sciences -- his usage, however is somewhat broader and narrow, for, technically speaking psychology and ethology are universal and true sciences -- that is, their laws are universal and as such they "stand" over and above the rest of the moral sciences -- more will be said on this matter when we deal with the verification process of the historical method. His conception is broader in that moral sciences include art and morality -- we today would be hesitant to make this identification.

Secondly, psychology and ethology are sciences whose laws are established by induction. Mill considers them to be apodictic. Of course, whether or not any induction -- be it eliminative or enumerative -- can establish such certainty is, indeed, dubitable.

20. Of course, implicit here is the view that science essentially is a hypothetical-deductive endeavor that establishes certain truth when possible; probabilities are not, hence, scientific in a strict sense.

21. The Moral Sciences, p.79. The relevance of this remark is germane to Mill's critique of MacCaulays "chemicalism". Of course, the questions can be asked: how is this truth established and from whence comes its certainty. For Mill it is a psychological truth deducible from the basic laws of association -- hence it is apodictic. Then, of course, arises the question how apodictic are these latter?

22. A major cause of concern here is Mill's lack of giving to the potential scientist a set of criteria whereby he could determine the relevancy of the phenomena in any given case. In short, what are the rules which determine what phenomena are germane.

23. A System, BK III, xi, 1-3. We see now why Mill says that he need only recapitulate the "proper method," for it is but a restatement in book six of his System of Logic of what he earlier said in book three.

24. The Moral Sciences, p.82.

25. Ibid., R.P. Anschutz in his work The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953) stresses the basic logical-epistemological dualism that colors all of Mill's scientific methodology. Specifically, when Mill talks about discovering the tendencies inherent in social phenomena he is talking the language of a realist. Anschutz notes:

> "In regard to induction he (Mill) assumes that all particulars are expressions of underlying universals, and so he arrives at the conclusion that certainty is attainable by way of scientific experiment. In regard to the syllogism, on the contrary, he maintains that universals are merely collections of particulars and he allows us to conclude, therefore, that all inference is uncertain." (p.180).

This latter view is a nominalistic contention. Anschutz notes, quite correctly I think, that it is impossible to get theoretical consistency if one maintains both of these views simultaneously.

26. Ibid., p.83.

27. Here it is oportune to note Mill's conception of laws: the ultimate explanatory propositions are axioms or universal laws (e.g., the laws of association); descriptive laws are laws that have been explained -- a middle-level concept (e.g. this would be a hypothesis that has been verified); finally, there are empirical laws or mere, generalizations which have yet to be verified. Cf. A System, III, IV.

28. Ibid., p.83.

29. This is the first mention of Mill's "organistic" conception of society. This will come to full flower in the discussion of the inverse method. We can note here in passing one anomaly: how can Mill rectify the view (1) that social causation is mechanical, with the view (2) that society is paradigmatically like a physical organ?

30. Ibid., p.85. The words "in the main", are the problem here. Given the proposition that society is totally interactional how can anyone anywhere get scientific (i.e., certain) conclusions by isolating those causes which produce certain kinds of social facts.

31. J.S. Mill, Bentham, in Essays on Politics and Culture, ed. G. Himmelfarb (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p.84.

32. Anschutz in his Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p.86, misses this point; viz., that the inverse method deals with social change. Anschutz also contends (p.86) that Mill really does not make any concessions to MacCaulay's empiricism and that he, at heart, remains addicted to the Benthamite single-factor, abstract deductive, rationalistic syndrom. Perhaps this is the case with his moral philosophy, but it is the contention of this paper that he seriously entertained and adopted MacCaulay's principle of empirical/verification.

33. The Moral Sciences, pp. 100-101.

> "The fundamental problem...of the social sciences is to find the laws according to which any state of society produces the state which succeeds it."

34. Ibid., p. 99.

> "The question is...what are the causes which produce, and the phenomena which characterize, States of Society, generally."

35. Ibid., p. 100.

36. Ibid., Karl Popper in his Poverty of Historicism, esp. pp. 12-130, unmercifully attacks the organistic model as dangerous folly and anti-democratic metaphysics.

37. Ibid., p.103.

> "(These laws) can only be empirical.... The succession of states of the human mind and of society cannot have any independent law of its own; it must depend on the psychological and ethological laws which govern the action of circumstances on men and of men on circumstances."

We again encounter Mill's mechanical paradigm of human interaction. It is obvious that this procedure of validation is contingent upon the establishment of both

of the sciences (Mill never did say what the apodictic laws of character were, for example). Again we see Mill's tendency to simplify: how is the validation effected; what rules are operative, etc., etc., etc.

38. Ibid., p.114.

39. Ibid., p.115.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Obviously, Mill is employing the inverse method to discover this law.

44. Ibid. This would be a rationalist coup of grand design.

45. Ibid., p.116.

46. Ibid., p. 117.

47. Ibid., p.118.

48. It seems that Mill has regressed back to a kind of Benthamite single-factor theory. What society is, he states, can be explained by the beliefs of man. Now the theoretical question arises: does this pronouncement contradict his other axiom, namely, that in society the universal law is the composition of causes. In short, has Mill regressed to a kind of rationalistic monism of the same ilk that he so vociferously attacked when he criticized his father.

In a sense, he has. Given that what he has said here is an accurate reading of his intensions one could assert that yes, Mill has reduced all social causation to the factor of belief. But while belief is itself a class-name, its members though not infinite are numerous. The structure of belief, as anyone honors, is, from the side of its content, varied.

Hence, Mill here reduces causation to a formal, single principle -- namely, belief. While, materially, the content of belief and, ipso facto, the nature of social causation, is indeed a "composition" of many diverse elements.

The question is, it seems to me, not that Mill has contradicted himself -- for I feel he has not -- rather we must question his basic premise that the major independent variable that structures society is belief.

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VITA

Brent Wall was born on April 2, 1942, the son of Robert and Phyllis Wall. He is married and has one son. He received his B.A. in 1964 from Ursinus College. From 1964-66 he served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Peru.